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ABSTRACT 
Th is  paper surveys t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  P u b l i c  Choice t h e o r y  ( t h a t  i s ,  t h e  
economic approach t o  p o l i t i c s )  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy. The c e n t r a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and t h e  main t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts o f  t h i s  approach a re  d i s -  
cussed and i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  va r i ous  problem areas a re  descr ibed.  The 
advantages and disadvantages o f  t h e  P u b l i c  Choice v i ewpo in t  compared w i t h  
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  ( po l i t i ca l - sc i ence -based )  v iew o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
economy a r e  evaluated.  It i s  concluded t h a t  t h e  former  approach represen ts  
an i n t e r e s t i n g  and wo r thwh i l e  complement t o  t h e  l a t t e r .  

THE PUBLIC CHOICE VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Bruno S. Frey* 
I. The Neslect of Public Choice 
There can be no question that the study of international political eco- 
nomy has received insufficient attention in both economics and political 
science. As one writer puts it: 
"...in the twentieth century the study of international political 
economy has been neglected. Politics and economics have been 
divorced from each other and isolated in analysis and theory ... 
Consequently, international pol it ical economy has been fragmented 
into international politics and international economics". 1 ) 
Though this gap sti 1 1  exists today, it has been narrowed considerably by 
the emergence of a new field from international re1 ations theory, a field 
commonly known as "International Political Econoniy". There is no need to 
survey it here, because this has recently been done2) and because the basic 
contributions3) are by now well known - at least among international rela- 
tions scholars. There are also a number of coll ections of re1 evant 
4 articles . 
*Professor of Economics at the University of Zurich. This paper was written 
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Pol i t i ca l -sc ience-based scholars q u i t e  outspokenly c l a i m  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
P o l i t i c a l  Economy" as t h e i r  proper and exc lus ive  domain. It i s  argued t h a t  
" the  foundat ion  of a  r e a l i s t i c  study o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
economy a re  n o t  d i s s i m i l a r  t o  those o f  convent ional  p o l i t i c a l  
115) a n a l y s i s  . 
Accord ingly ,  "power" and " a u t h o r i t y "  a r e  taken t o  be t h e  c e n t r a l  concepts w i t h  
which t o  s tudy t h e  problems. I n  add i t i on ,  the  ana l ys i s  has t o  be "dynamic" 
and has t o  take  h i s t o r i c a l  processes i n t o  account6).  It i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  
that,as a  c o n ~ e q u e n c e ~ t h e r e  i s  a  marked tendency t o  r e j e c t  any approaches 
based on economic theory.  Thus i t  i s  s ta ted :  
"The bases o f  an e f f e c t i v e  ana l ys i s  o f  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy 
must ... be roo ted  i n  a  number o f  assumptions ... t h a t  a r e  incom- 
p a t i  b l  e  w i t h  neo-cl ass i ca l  economic theory" .  7 )  
With respec t  t o  performance, a  survey b l u n t l y  s ta tes :  
"The ' tex tbook  or thodoxy '  o f  neo-c lass ica l  [economic] theory  i s  
successfu l  l y  chal lenged by t h e  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  and t h e  fo rmu la t i on  
o f  an a l t e r n a t i v e  perspect ive" .  8 ) 
This  r e j e c t i o n  o f  economic theory  does not ,  however, seem t o  be based on an 
ex tens i ve  knowledge o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  economic approach 
t o  p o l i t i c s ,  u s u a l l y  c a l l e d  Pub l i c  Choice, seems t o  be almost t o t a l l y  d i s -  
regardedg).  The " c l a s s i c a l "  w r i t e r s  i n  Pub1 i c  Choice, such as Arrow, Downs, 
Buchanan, Tu l lock ,  Niskanen, a re  hard ly ,  i f  ever, mentioned. It i s  on l y  
due t o  t h i s  ove rs igh t  t h a t  a  survey w r i t t e n  as r e c e n t l y  as 1981 can main- 
t a i n :  
"Neo-cl ass i ca l  theory  . . . t r e a t s  po l  i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  processes 
p e r f u n c t o r i l y ,  as extraneous, and, a t  best ,  exogenous f a c t o r s " .  10) 
What Publ i c  Choice has done i s  e x a c t l y  t o  t r e a t  p o l i t i c a l  processes as 
11 1 endogenous f a c t o r s  . 
This paper endeavours t o  show t h a t  
( 1 )  Pub l ic  Choice has been app l ied  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
economy, and t h a t  t he re  i s  a la rge ,  and r a p i d l y  growing l i t e r a t u r e  on 
the  subject ;  
( 2 )  Pub l i c  Choice o f f e r s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  and worthwhi le  approach t o  the  
area, complementing the  po l i t i ca l -sc ience-based views o f  " In -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c a l  Economy" i n  a usefu l  way; 
and t h a t  consequently 
( 3 )  t he  c l a i m  f o r  e x c l u s i v i t y  made by some w r i t e r s  based i n  p o l i t i c a l  
science should be replaced by the  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  need f o r  mutual 
c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n  o f  t he  two ( p a r t l y  competing) approaches. 
Sect ion I 1  o f  t h i s  paper discusses the  Pub l ic  Choice approach, f i r s t  out-  
l i n i n g  i t s  cen t ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and then going through t h e  main concepts 
from Pub l ic  Choice used i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy. Sect ion I 1 1  
surveys some o f  the  major problem areas i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  pol i t i c a l  economy 
t o  which Pub l ic  Choice theory  has been appl ied.  The concluding Sect ion I V  
prov ides a ( p r e l  im inary)  eval ua t i on  o f  the  Publ i c  Choice approach, seeking 
t o  determine i t s  advantages and disadvantages as compared t o  pol i t i c a l  -science- 
based i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy. 
11. The P u b l i c  Choice A ~ ~ r o a c h  
1. General c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
Pub l i c  Choice, sometimes c a l l e d  the Economic Theory o f  P o l i t i c s  o r  (New) 
P o l i t i c a l  Economy, seeks t o  analyze p o l i t i c a l  processes, and the  i n t e r a c -  
t i o n  between the  economy and the  p o l i t y  by us ing the  t o o l s  o f  modern (neo- 
c l a s s i c a l )  ana l ys i s .  I t  prov ides an e x p l i c i t  s tudy o f  t h e  workings o f  po l  i- 
t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and o f  t he  behaviour o f  governments, p a r t i e s ,  voters,  
i n t e r e s t  groups and (pub1 i c )  bureaucracies. Pub1 i c  Choice i s  p a r t  o f  a  move- 
ment which endeavours t o  apply  the  " r a t i o n a l  behaviour" approach t o  areas 
beyond ( t r a d i t i o n a l  ) economi csl 'I. I n  recent  years, an i nc reas ing  number o f  
p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s 1 3 ) ,  s o c i o l o g i s t s 1 4 )  and soc ia l  psychologis ts15)  have 
taken up t h i s  approach, thus c o n s t i t u t i n g  one o f  t he  r a r e  successful  examples 
o f  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  research. 
Both t h e  " r a t i o n a l  behaviour approach t o  soc ia l  problems" and P u b l i c  Choice 
theory  a r e  charac ter ized  by the  f o l l o w i n g  features:  
(i) The i n d i v i d u a l  i s  t he  bas ic  u n i t  o f  ana lys is .  He i s  assumed t o  be 
" r a t i o n a l "  i n  t h e  sense o f  responding i n  a  systemat ic  and hence pre- 
d i c t a b l e  way t o  i ncen t i ves :  courses o f  a c t i o n  a r e  chosen which y i e l d  
t h e  h ighes t  n e t  b e n e f i t s  according t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  I s  own u t i l i t y  
funct ion.  Contrary t o  what i s  o f t e n  be l ieved by non-spec ia l i s ts ,  i t  
i s  n o t  assumed t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  f u l l y  informed. Rather, t he  
amount o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  sought i s  t h e  r e s u l t  of an ( o f t e n  i m p l i c i t )  cos t -  
b e n e f i t  ca lcu lus ,  and i t  i s  indeed shown t h a t  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  arena 
i t  o f t e n  does n o t  pay t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  t o  be wel l - in formed ( " r a t i o n a l  
ignorance") .  
( i i )  The i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behaviour i s  expla ined by concen t ra t i ng  on t h e  
changes i n  t h e  cons t ra in t s  t o  which he i s  exposed; t h e  preferences 
a re  assumed t o  be constant.  The i n d i v i d u a l s  a re  assumed t o  be capa- 
b l e  o f  comparing a1 te, rnat ives,  t o  see s u b s t i t u t i o n  poss i  b i  1  i t i e s ,  
and t o  make marginal adjustments. 
( i i i )  The ana l ys i s  s t resses r i g o u r  (and i s  sometimes fo rmal16) ) ,  and the  
r e s u l t s  must y i e l d  a  p r o p o s i t i o n  which ( a t  l e a s t  i n  p r i n c i p l e )  can 
be subjected t o  econometric ( o r  p o l i t o m e t r i c )  t e s t i n g .  
There i s  no need t o  go i n t o  general Pub l i c  Choice theory  here17);  o n l y  i t s  
appl i c a t i o n s  t o  problems o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy are  re1  evant  
t o  t h i s  d iscussion.  
2. The concepts appl i e d  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  pol  i t i c a l  economy 
I n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i e l d ,  some t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts developed i n  Publ i c  
Choice are  used p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f t e n .  Four such concepts w i l l  be b r i e f l y  
mentioned here i n  order  t o  i l l u m i n a t e  t h e  Pub l i c  Choice approach t o  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  po l  i t i c a l  economy. 
2.1 Publ i c  goods theory  
Th is  i s  c e r t a i n l y  t h e  concept used most f r e q u e n t l y  w i t h i n  economics-based 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy18). I t s  usefulness i s  we1 1  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  by ~ i n d l e b e r ~ e r " ) ,  i n  which he looks a t  var ious  aspects o f  
t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy from the  p o i n t  of view o f  publ i c  goods, and a t  
t h e  tendency f o r  f r e e  r i d i n g  ( i n  which a  publ i c  good i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  a l l ,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of whether they have con t r i bu ted  t o  i t s  supply  o r  no t ) .  Thus, 
law and order  can be considered a  p u b l i c  good forming an important  comple- 
ment t o  f o re ign  t rade.  I t s  absence can lead t o  a  ser ious d i s r u p t i o n  i n  i n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  exchange. The i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the  s t a t e  may a l so  be looked upon 
as a  p u b l i c  good. The h igh  costs a r i s i n g  when i t  does - n o t  e x i s t  may be il- 
1  u s t r a t e d  by the  example of Germany i n  1790. A t  t h i s  t ime the re  were 1,700 
t a r i f f  boundaries w i t h  300 r u l e r s  l evy ing  t o l l s  as they pleased. No wonder 
t h a t  t h e  advantages o f  t rade exchange could n o t  be e x p l o i t e d  t o  any degree! 
The ex is tence o f  na t i ona l  monetary i n s t i t u t i o n s  may a l s o  be looked upon as 
a  p u b l i c  good. 
There are  a  g r e a t  many o the r  app l i ca t i ons  of the  p u b l i c  goods concept and 
the  concomitant f r e e  r i d e r  problem which come t o  mind, such as t rade  l i b e -  
r a l i z a t i o n ,  na t iona l ism,  a l l i a n c e s  and burden sharing. Another a p p l i c a t i o n  
i s  t he  p rese rva t i on  o f  t he  na tu ra l  environment beyond na tu ra l  f r o n t i e r s ,  
such as the  campaign aga ins t  whal ing o r  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  t he  atmosphere. 
The use o f  t he  p u b l i c  goods concept i s  extremely usefu l  and i n t u i t i v e l y  
p l a u s i b l e .  The ease o f  appl i c a t i o n  may, however, sometimes h ide  under l y ing  
problems. The exac t  cond i t ions  under which f r e e  r i d i n g  occurs are  s t i l l  un- 
known; o f t e n  i t  i s  s imply assumed t h a t  ac tors  do n o t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  the  
common cause. Laboratory experiments o f  p u b l i c  goods s i t u a t i o n s  suggest 
t h a t  f r e e  r i d i n g  does n o t  occur as o f t e n  as pure economic theory would 
have us think2') .  Moreover, i n s t i t u t i o n a l  cond i t ions  a re  o f t e n  such t h a t  
f r e e  r i d i n g  i s  discouraged. 
Even when the  na t i ona l  ac tors  f u l l y  perceive t h a t  i t  i s  advantageous f o r  
them t o  cooperate f o r  the  p rov i s ion  o f  a  p u b l i c  good, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  and 
sometimes even impossib le t o  coordinate some j o i n t  ac t ion .  I n  view o f  t h e  
general impossi b i  1  i t y  o f  f o r c i n g  the  independent na t i ona l  ac tors  t o  co- 
operate, the  f r e e  r i d e r  problem can be overcome by f i n d i n g  r u l e s  o r  con- 
- -
21 s t i t u t i o n a l  agreements which l a y  down the  cond i t ions  f o r  cooperat ion . 
I n  o rder  t o  f i n d  a  s e t  o f  " ru les "  which the  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a r e  w i l l i n g  t o  
accept i n  a  s t a t e  o f  ( p a r t i a l )  unce r ta in t y  about t he  future, the  ac tors  
must b e l i e v e  t h a t  obeying the  r u l e s  w i l l  be advantageous t o  them. The 
agreement must lead t o  a  r e s u l t  which i s  Pareto-superior w i t h  respect  
t o  the  expectat ions o f  a l l  actors,  Decause on l y  under these cond i t ions  
i s  t he re  vo lun ta ry  cooperat ion, i .e. unanimity among the  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  
These cond i t i ons  a re  n o t  e a s i l y  s e t  up and maintained i n  t h e  i n t e r -  
na t i ona l  system. Once a  r u l e  o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n  has been agreed upon, the  
problem i s  t o  ensure t h a t  t he  r u l e s  a re  observed and t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  
nat ions have no i n c e n t i v e  t o  back ou t  o f  o r  at tempt t o  a l t e r  the  agreement. 
The " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l "  approach has been app l ied  t o  var ious problems i n  I n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  Pol i t i c a l  Economy, e.g. environmental and f i s h e r i e s  pacts, i n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  pub1 i c  hea l th  accords, cooperat ion about f o recas t i ng  (,and i n  
t he  f u t u r e  poss ib ly  i n f l u e n c i n g )  t he  weather, t h e  use o f  ou ter  space and 
the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  j u d i c i a l  systemZ2). There a re  two areas i n  which the  es- 
tab l i shment  and enforcement o f  r u l e s  have occupied a  c e n t r a l  p o s i t i o n :  
F i r s t ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monetary arrangements may be considered t o  be r u l e s  
which, i f  we1 1  designed, a re  advantageous t o  a1 1  , b u t  where t h e  i ncen t i ves  
f o r  d e v i a t i o n  a r e  a l s o  marked. It i s  therefore necessary t o  consider  n o t  
on l y  t h e  Pareto-super ior i  ty o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  monetary scheme, b u t  a1 so 
t h e  b e n e f i t s  and costs t o  the  i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  na t ionsZ3) .  This  
' aspect has been overlooked i n  the  many proposals made i n  t h i s  area; they 
u s u a l l y  ( i m p l i c i t l j r )  assume t h a t  t he re  i s  a  "benevolent i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i c -  
t a t o r "  who w i l l  p u t  them i n t o  e f f e c t .  
An impor tan t  r e l a t e d  ques t ion  i s  why c e r t a i n  r u l e s  have n o t  i n f l u e n c e d  be- 
hav iour  as much as one might  have expected. An example i s  prov ided by t h e  
B r e t t o n  Woods system, i n  which changes i n  exchange r a t e s  have been made t o o  
i n f r e q u e n t l y ,  and g e n e r a l l y  t oo  l a t e 2 4 ) .  The reason i s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  
fo rces  agai ns t both deva lua t ion  and reva lua t i on .  Deval u a t i  on i s  be1 i eved 
t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  by the  vo ters  as admi t t i ng  f i n a n c i a l  f a i l u r e ,  w i t h  nega- 
t i v e  consequences f o r  t he  government i n  power. A r e v a l u a t i o n  i s  good f o r  
t h e  vo te rs  (consumers) b u t  very  bad f o r  the  wel l -organized group o f  ex- 
p o r t e r s  and impor t  compet i tors ,  so t h a t  the  government may again r u n  i n t o  
t roub le .  I n  view o f  t h i s  unwi l l i ngness  t o  a d j u s t  exchange ra tes ,  an agree- 
ment a1 low ing  f r e e l y  f l e x i b l e  exchange ra tes  may be p r e f e r a b l e  because the  
i ssue  i s  then taken o u t  o f  government (and c e n t r a l  bank) p o l i t i c s .  
The second area i n  which r ~ ~ l e s  p l a y  an important  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r o l e  i s  t h a t  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  common p rope r t y  resources. The need f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  con- 
ven t ions  and r u l e s  i s  obvious i n  view o f  t he  p o l l u t i o n  o f  t he  atmosphere 
and t h e  ove r - f i sh ing  and over-explo i  t a t i o n  o f  t h e  oceans25). The d i f f i c l ~ l t y  
o f  reaching agreement on what these r u l e s  should be i s  e q u a l l y  well-known. 
It i s  hard t o  o b t a i n  a  consensus because none o f  t h e  coun t r i es  i nvo l ved  
can be fo rced t o  accept t he  r u l e s .  The on l y  acceptable r u l e s  a r e  those which 
produce such h igh  aggregate (ne t )  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  they can be d i s t r i b u t e d  
among t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  coun t r i es  i n  such a  way t h a t  everyone f i n d s  i t  
advantageous t o  agree and t o  s t i c k  t o  t h e  ru les .  Such r u l e s  do n o t  u s u a l l y  
e x i s t ;  i t  i s  q u i t e  poss ib le  t h a t  agreement on some o f  t he  c u r r e n t  proposals 
concerning international common property resources would be worse than no 
agreement a t  a1 1 .  
2 .2 .  Voting theory 
A second se t  of concepts used i n  the Public Choice approach to international 
polit ical economy deals with the properties of both classical ( i n  particular 
majority rule)  and new voting procedures26). Of the newly developed voting 
schemes, the fol lowing three are of particular interest  for  international 
polit ical economy: 
( a )  The voting by veto rule27) a1 lows each nation to include i t s  own propo- 
s i t ion  in the se t  of alternatives.  The decision i s  made by each nation 
 with^ one exception) deleting that alternative which i t  dis l ikes 
most. The order i n  which the nations "vote" i s  determined randomly. The 
alternative which i s  n o t  deleted b u t  remains i s  the collective choice. 
Obviously, each nation has an incentive not to  introduce an  al ternat ive 
strongly disliked by one or more other nat ion(s) ;  there i s  even an i n -  
centive to  actively consider the interests of the other nations. 
This voting rule has several good features: i t  a1 lows the expression of 
preference intensi t ies  ; i t  brings about Pareto-optimal outcomes ; nobody 
can be exploited because of the veto right;  and there i s  an unbiased 
revelation of preferences ( i  .e. there i s  no incentive for  s t rategic  
voting). Voting by veto i s ,  on the other hand, rather clumsy to ad- 
minister and i s  open to undue influence by coalitions. 
( b )  The voting rights of a group may be i n  proportion to the financial con- 
tribution i t  makes to an organization. Such a rule exis t s ,  for  example, 
fo r  countries represented on the Board of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund.  The properties of such a voting system have been studied 
by observing i t  in operation in a number of water purification associ- 
28 ) ations . 
This voting rule a1 lows the use of votes which can be weighted accor- 
ding to  a country's stake in a particular issue, i .e. the weighting 
can vary across issues. A f lexible  rule of th i s  type may increase the 
acceptabili ty of the decisions taken. When the t radi t ional  "one nation, 
one vote" rule i s  used, the largest and most severely affected coun- 
t r i e s  may simply disregard the collective decision. 
( c )  In the preference revealing mechanism29), each nation casting a vote 
and thereby negatively affecting the u t i l i t y  of any other nation (be- 
-
cause without tha t  country's vote the decision would have been diffe-  
rent)  must pay a tax equal to  the d i su t i l i t y  imposed on other nations. 
This voting procedure has various advantages over simple majority rule:  
i t  allows the expression of preference intensity;  i t  i s  nearly Pareto- 
efficient3'); i t  i s  not subject to the voting paradox; and i t  provides 
an incentive for  the participants to  reveal t he i r  t rue preferences. 
The disadvantages are similar to  those of voting by veto: .it i s  sub-  
j ec t  to  coalit ion influence; i t  i s  complicated to  administer and 
rather d i f f i c u l t  to  understand ( a t  least  for  non-economists) . 
These three and other newly devised voting rules may be useful i n  those 
cases in which nations are  unwilling to  be subjected to  the traditional 
simple majority rule ( fo r  example, in international ins t i tu t ions)  , or 
where traditional methods have not worked we1 1 .  They obviously wi 11 
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n o t  be i n t r oduced  i n  bodies where t h e  decis ion-making i s  reasonably  
w e l l - f u n c t i o n i n g ,  b u t  may p l a y  a  u s e f u l  r o l e  i n  b reak ing  deadlocks 
under o t h e r  c i rcumstances. 
2.3. Theorv o f  r e n t  seek inq 
Rent seeking analyses t h e  f a c t  t h a t  scarce resources ( l a b o u r  and f i n a n c e )  
a r e  consumed i n  f i g h t s  over  t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  which b e n e f i t  those sec to r s  
p r o t e c t e d  f rom compet i t i on ,  b u t  which o therw ise  serve no s o c i a l l y  u s e f u l  
purpose31). It i s  u s e f u l  t o  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between two a c t i v i t i e s ,  bo th  o f  
which from s o c i e t y ' s  p o i n t  o f  v iew waste  resource^^^): " r e n t  seeking" i s  t h e  
a c t i v i t y  by which t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i  ons ( t a r i f f s ,  quotas)  generate r e n t s  t o  
one 's  advantage; "revenue seeking" i s  t h e  f i g h t  over  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
revenues and i s  thus  a  general  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  phenomenon. 
Rent and revenue seek ing a r e  o f  obvious importance f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i -  
t i c a l  economy. Care should be taken, however, n o t  t o  f a l l  p rey  t o  t h e  " n i r -  
vana syndrome", i . e .  t o  compare a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e r e  i s  a  compe t i t i ve  
s t r u g g l e  over  t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w i t h  an i d e a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  f r e e  t r ade .  The 
r e l e v a n t  comparison i s  between d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  e x i s t i n g  
i n  r e a l  l i f e ,  f o r  example between a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which t h e  i n t e r e s t  groups 
f i g h t i n g  f o r  (and a g a i n s t )  t a r i f f s  a r e  organized a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  and 
one i n  which t h e  i n t e r e s t  groups a re  organized a t  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  l e v e l .  
Po l i t i co -economic  models s tudy  t h e  interdependence between t h e  economy and 
t h e  p o l i t y  by e x p l i c i t l y  ana l yz i ng  t h e  behaviour o f  ac to r s  and t e s t i n g  t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  p r o p o s i t i o n s  us ing  econometr ic ( o r  r a t h e r  po l  i t o m e t r i c )  tech-  
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n i ~ j u e s ~ ~ ) .  The simp1 e s t  such model analyzes the fol 1 owing circular  system: 
The s t a t e  of the economy influences the voters' evaluation of the govern- 
ment's performance, which i s  reflected by a vote or government popularity 
function. If i t  considers i t s  chances of re-election to be poor, the govern- 
ment reacts by using economic pol icy instruments to  influence the s t a t e  of 
the economy and thus the voters '  decisions. I t  should be noted that  the 
government's actions may depend on i t s  ideology i f  i t  considers i t s  re- 
election chances t o  be good. The model i s ,  of course, a great simplifica- 
t ion of r ea l i ty ,  b u t  i t  has already been shown that  the framework can be 
extended to  incorporate additional actors and relationships, and further 
work on t h i s  i s  in progress. 
A politico-economic model for  an individual country can be extended i n  
two ways to incl ude international pol i tico-economic re1 ationshi ps : 
The f i r s t  approach i s  to  concentrate on the internal connections between 
the economy and pol i ty b u t  also to  introduce international influences. In 
th i s  case the pol i tico-economic model outlined above i s  amended by factors 
emerging from the international sphere. One such factor i s  the s t a t e  of 
the balance of payments, which may influence the voters' evaluation of the 
government's performance. A survey of over one hundred empirical studies 
of vote and popularity functions f inds,  however, that  only s ix  of them in- 
34) clude the balance of payments among the indicators of economic conditions . 
Only i n  the case of the United Kingdom does i t  influence voters '  decisions 
i n  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  significant way. I n  the other cases (for  Denmark and 
Australia) the coefficients are sniall and insignificant. I t  has to  be con- 
cluded that  even i n  countries with seemingly permanent and serious balance 
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of payments troubles the voters e i ther  do not perceive them, or do not 
35 (d i rec t ly)  punish the government for  i t  t o  any s ignif icant  extent . 
International pol i t ical  events may be another factor affecting votes and 
government popularity. I t  has been empirically shown i n  various studies 
for  the United States 36) that  when the country i s  subjected to  an inter-  
national pol i t ical  c r i s i s ,  the population tends to  " ra l ly  round the f lag".  
A similar e f fec t  may hold for other countries. 
Another influence which may be introduced into politico-economic models i s  
the foreign intervention in the country's internal polity which may occur 
i f  the resul ts  of a particular election are considered undesirable by the 
foreign nation. 
The government pol i t ic ians may also have specific international pol i t i ca l  
preferences and i nf 1 uence the internal economy accordingly , provided the i r  
re-election chances are  not seriously diminished. 
Finally, the use of the economic policy instruments i s  influenced by in ter -  
national economic conditions. The possibil i ty of creating a "polit ical  
business cycle" aimed a t  improving re-election chances also depends on in- 
stitutional conditions within the international economy. I t  has been ar- 
gued37) that  an expansionary economic policy yields more favourable short- 
run inflation-unemployment (or  real income) trade-offs with a system of ad- 
justable pegs than with a depreciating exchange rate.  A system of adjusta- 
ble pegs may thus be expected to  increase the government's incentive to  
attempt to  gain votes by introducing an expansionary policy before elect ions,  
and devaluating thereafter.  
The second approach goes one s t e p  f u r t h e r  by cons ide r i ng  t h e  mutual i n t e r -  
dependence of domest ic and f o r e i g n  economies and po l  i t i e s .  T h i s  research  
s t r a t e g y  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  we1 1  -developed w i t h  regard  t o  arms r a c e  models. 
Such models have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  analyzed t he  mutual responses o f  two na t i ons  
t o  each o t h e r ' s  defence o u t l a y s  i n  a  r a t h e r  mechan is t i c  way f o l l o w i n g  t he  
o r i g i n a l  ~ i c h a r d s o n ~ ~ )  ideas.  I n  t h e  l a s t  few years,  however, t h e  dec i s i on -  
making s t r u c t u r e  has been g r e a t l y  improved by i n t r o d u c i n g  elements o f  Pub- 
l i c  Choice. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i t  has been r e a l i s e d  t h a t  a  n a t i o n ' s  response t o  
t h e  armament o f  ano ther  n a t i o n  depends on t he  government's u t i l i t y ,  and i s  
s u b j e c t  t o  t he  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by t h e  d e s i r e  t o  be r e - e l e c t e d  as w e l l  as 
by econoniic resources. The models have been econometr ical  l y  es t imated  and 
39 t h e i r  behaviour has been analyzed w i t h  t h e  he lp  o f  ex tens i ve  s imu la t i ons  . 
Both o f  t he  aforementioned approaches a r e  use fu l ;  t h e  second approach i s ,  
o f  course, much more f a r - r e a c h i n g  and may t h e r e f o r e  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  app ly  
t o  po l  i t ico-economic i n t e r a c t i o n  as a  whole. It may t h e r e f o r e  be adv i sab le  
t o  r e s t r i c t  i t  t o  one p a r t i c u l a r  i s s u e  a t  a t ime.  
Th i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  paper has examined t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts o f t e n  ap- 
p l i e d  i n  t h e  P u b l i c  Choice approach t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy i n  
t h e  p a s t  - these i n c l u d e  pub1 i c  goods theory  ( i n c l u d i n g  r u l e s  and s o c i a l  
c o n t r a c t s ) ,  v o t i n g  theory ,  and t h e  t h e o r y  o f  ren t -seek ing  - o r  which cou ld  
f r u i t f u l  l y  be a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  (such as po l  i tico-economic model 1  i n g )  . 
The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  e x i s t i n g  t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts has t h e  advantage t h a t  
t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s  and e s p e c i a l l y  t h e i r  l i m i t s  a r e  ( a t  l e a s t  i n  p r i n c i p l e )  
known, t h a t  they  "au ide"  - t h e  research, and t h a t  when they a r e  used i n  an 
imag ina t i ve  way i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be obta ined.  There i s ,  
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however, a danger that theoretical concepts may be applied to problems for 
which they are not suited, and that in the desire to obtain (quick) re- 
sults the particular characteristics of the situation are not sufficiently 
considered. The intention of this section was to illustrate'the type of 
explicit theoretical concepts underlying the Public Choice approach to in- 
ternational political economy using selected examples; the 1 ist of concepts 
given here is by no means complete. The use of such explicit theories is 
one of the main features distinguishing this approach from the political 
scientists' International Political Economy, which re1 ies more on imp1 ici t 
theorizing. 
111. Problems Analyzed 
Th is  s e c t i o n  endeavours t o  i l l u s t r a t e  the  subs tan t ive  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t h a t  
have been made by P u b l i c  Choice t o  t he  t h e o r e t i c a l  and emp i r i ca l  a n a l y s i s  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy. Again, no complete survey o f  a l l  t h e  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  Pub l i c  Choice t o  t he  area i s  intended, nor  would i t  be 
poss ib le  i n  an a r t i c l e  o f  t h i s  leng th .  The areas se lec ted  represent  those 
i n  which t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f ,  and i n  t he  author- 's view the  most i n t e r e s t i n g ,  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have been made. They a re  ( 1 )  the  format ion o f  t a r i f f s  and 
t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  ( 2 )  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  investment, ( 3 )  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i d  
and ( 4 )  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  and bargain ing.  The s h o r t  d iscuss ions  
o f  these areas which f o l l o w  should show t h a t  considerable work has been, 
and i s  being, done by economists i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy. Th is  
suggests t h a t  i t  would be use fu l  t o  consider  t he  economists' work i n  p o l i -  
t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  ' I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Pol i t i c a l  Economy. 
1. T a r i f f s  and t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
Most economists approach t h e  ana lys is  o f  t a r i f f s  (and o the r  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
on t rade )  from t h e  same standpoint :  they s t a r t  from the  bas i c  p r o p o s i t i o n  
o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r ade  theory  t h a t  f r e e  t rade  leads t o  h ighe r  r e a l  income 
and i s  des i rab le  n o t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  wor ld  as a  whole b u t  a l so  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  
countr ies40) .  The problem f o r  p o l i t i c a l  economists i s  thus t o  e x p l a i n  why 
t a r i f f s  never theless e x i s t ,  and why governnients so r a r e l y  seem t o  t ake  the  
we l fa re- inc reas ing  (Pareto-opt imal  ) s tep  of aboll'shing t a r i f f s .  It might  
be expected t h a t  t he  government would w in  votes by abol i ,sh ing t a r i f f s ,  
e i t h e r  because a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  b e n e f i t s  d i r e c t l y ,  o r  because 
i t  can r e d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  gains so t h a t  a  m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  e l e c t o r a t e  i s  be t -  
t e r  o f f  t han  i n  a  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  t a r i f f s .  I f  t he  c i t i z e n s  were t o  determine 
whether t o  have t a r i f f s  by a  d i r e c t  s i n g l e  m a j o r i t y  v o t e  i n  an assembly, 
t he  median v o t e r  would c a s t  h i s  vo te  i n  f avou r  o f  f r e e  t r ade .  
The simp1 i s t i c  assumptions o f  t h e  median v o t e r  model must, however, be 
m o d i f i e d  i n  a  number o f  impo r tan t  respec ts  i f  i t  i s  t o  r ep resen t  r e a l i t y ,  
and t h i s  p rov ides  an exp lana t i on  f o r  t h e  cont inuous ex i s tence  and sometimes 
even growth o f  t a r i f f s 4 1 ) .  A t  l e a s t  f i v e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  must be considered. 
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  t h e  l o s e r s  i n  any t a r i f f  reduc t ion ,  t h e  people engaged i n  
t h e  domest ic p roduc t i on  o f  t h e  goods concerned, a r e  n o t  compensated. I f  
t hey  form a  m a j o r i t y ,  they  o b s t r u c t  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  and/or e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  
t a r i f f s .  
The second m o d i f i c a t i o n  necessary i s  t o  cons ider  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  prospec- 
t i v e  ga ine rs  have l e s s  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  vote, t o  i n f o r m  
themselves, and t o  o rgan ize  and suppor t  a  pressure group t han  do t h e  l o s e r s .  
T a r i f f  r educ t i ons  a r e  a  p u b l i c  good whose b e n e f i t s  a re  rece i ved  by every-  
body, i n c l u d i n g  those n o t  t a k i n g  t h e  t r o u b l e  and i n c u r r i n g  t h e  c o s t  t o  
b r i n g  about  t h e  reduc t i on .  The p rospec t i ve  c o s t  o f  t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n  t o  t h e  
l o s e r s  i s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, ~i iuch more d i r e c t  and concentrated,  so t h a t  i t  
i s  wo r thwh i l e  f o r  them t o  engage i n  a  p o l i t i c a l  f i g h t  aga ins t  t a r i f f  reduc-  
t i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  we l l - de f i ned  shor t - te rm losses  t o  be exper ienced by 
t h e  l o s e r s  a re  much more v i s i b l e  and t h e r e f o r e  b e t t e r  perce ived  t han  un- 
42 1 c e r t a i n  ga ins t o  be made i n  t h e  d i s t a n t  f u t u r e  by t h e  winners . 
A t h i r d  m o d i f i c a t i o n  of t he  s imp le  median-voter model would cons ide r  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  p rospec t i ve  l o s e r s  i n  a.  f r e e  t r a d e  regime may be b e t -  
t e r  represented i n  par l iament  and i n  t h e  government than the  prospect ive 
winners, depending on the  system o f  vo t i ng .  
A f o u r t h  mod i f i ca t i on  would r e f l e c t  t he  f a c t  t h a t  l o g r o l l i n g  o r  vote t r a d i u g  
can make i t  poss ib le  t h a t  two issues, each o f  which i n d i v i d u a l l y  increases 
t h e  coun t r y ' s  wel fare,  can both be defeated by a  m a j o r i t y .  Vote t r a d i n g  may 
occur i f  groups o f  vo te rs  have unequal preference i n t e n s i t i e s  f o r  two 
issues 4 3 ) .  This i s  ve ry  l i k e l y  t o  be the  case where t a r i f f s  a re  concerned. 
Consider a  group I o f  vo te rs  engaged i n  domestic, import-competing a c t i v i t i e s .  
The i r  main preference i s  aga ins t  t h e  reduc t i on  o f  t a r i f f s  f o r  t h e i r  - own 
products (p ropos i t i on  A) and weakly i n  favour  o f  reduc t i on  o f  t a r i f f s  f o r  
some o ther  products ( p r o p o s i t i o n  B). Assume another group o f  vo ters  11, whose 
main i n t e r e s t  l i e s  i n  main ta in ing  the  t a r i f f  f o r  the  products concerned i n  
B y  and who have a  weak preference f o r  t a r i f f  reduc t ion  i n  A .  I f  n e i t h e r  o f  
t h e  two groups has a  m a j o r i t y ,  and the  other  voters perceive t h e  b e n e f i t s  
o f  f r e e  trade, both p ropos i t i ons  A and B would be accepted and f r e e  t rade  
establ ished.  I f , however, groups I and I 1  combined have a  m a j o r i t y ,  they 
can agree t o  t rade  votes: group I votes against  the  t a r i f f  r educ t i on  which 
group I 1  s t rong ly  opposes ( i  .e. votes against  B), provided group I1 votes 
aga ins t  the  t a r i f f  r educ t i on  which group I s t r o n g l y  opposes ( i . e .  votes 
aga ins t  A). This then leads t o  a  m a j o r i t y  vote aga ins t  t a r i f f  reduct ions,  
i .e.  p ropos i t ions  A and B a r e  both defeated. 
The f i n a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  the  median-voter model would inc lude the  f a c t  
t h a t  t a r i f f s  p rov ide  revenue f o r  governments, which i n  t h e i r  absence would 
f i n d  i t  even more d i f f i c u l t  t o  f inance p u b l i c  expenditure. Th is  i s  espe- 
c i a l  l y  t r u e  i n  developing count r ies  , where due t o  the  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  
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t a x  system there i s  l i t t l e  t a x  revenue. A government will therefore wish 
to secure this income source, and will for this reason oppose free trade. 
These five modifications of the simple median-voter model combine t o  ex- 
plain why free trade, which i s  optimal from the point of view of the coun- 
try as a whole, i s  not actually found in reality. The discussion suggests 
that there i s ,  on the contrary, a political market for protection. Protec- 
tion i s  demanded by particular groups of voters, firms and associated in- 
terest  groups and parties, and supplied by politicians and public bureau- 
crats. The Pub1 ic  Choice approach to international political economy a1 so 
stresses the importance of interest groups. I t  i s  generally assumed t h a t  
interests are industry-specific, i .e .  t h a t  capital and labour have the same 
position vis i vis t a r i f f s  and free trade. Findlay and we1 l i s ~ ~ ~ )  have con- 
structed a simplified model of tar i f f  formation which considers only two 
goods: the agricultural good i s  produced with the factor land, and the 
manufacturing product with the factor capital. Labour i s  used in b o t h  sec- 
tors and i s  taken from a common pool ( )  Competition i s  assumed to be per- 
fect.  The country considered i s  taken to have a relative advantage in 
agricultural goods, which i t  exports; manufactured goods are imported. The 
political system i s  assumed to be democratic and  pluralistic.  The landed 
interests use labour LT in order to promote free trade, while manufacturing 
interests use labour L K  in an attempt to increase tar i f fs  t. The "tariff  
formation function" i s  thus 
The political struggle i s  described by a so-called Cournot-Nash process in 
which each group assumes that the resources used by the other group to 
in f luence the t a r i f f  a re  constant,  and then c a l c u l a t e s  i t s  own opt imal  
i n p u t  o f  lobby ing  resources on t h i s  basis.  Assuming t h a t  the  process i s  
s table,  an e q u i l i b r i u m  l e v e l  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  lobby ing  expenditures 
i s  reached a t  p o i n t  E (see F ig .  I ) ,  t he  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  the  reac t i on  
funct ions o f  the  landed i n t e r e s t  ( a n t i - t a r i f f )  group T T '  and o f  the  
c a p i t a l  i n t e r e s t  ( p r o - t a r i f f )  group KK' . 
expendi ture 
a n t i - t a r i  ff 
i n t e r e s t s  
( 1 anded 
i n t e r e s t s )  
equal - t a r i f f  
t,. r * ,  4- 
1 ines :  
K I I 
L: expenditure on p r o - t a r i f f  
i n t e r e s t s  ( c a p i t a l  i n t e r e s t s )  
F ig .  1 : Determinat ion o f  lobby ing  expenditures and t a r i f f  l e v e l  
This  e q u i l i b r i u m  determines n o t  on l y  t he  t o t a l  l eve l  (L; + L;) and d i s t r i -  
b u t i o n  (L;/L~) o f  lobby ing  expenditures, b u t  a l so  t h e  l e v e l  o f  the  t a r i f f  
t* (see eq. 1 ) .  An e q u i l i b r i u m  above and t o  the l e f t  o f  t h a t  shown would 
r e s u l t  i n  a lower t a r i f f  (because, given L;, the  a n t i - t a r i f f  groups use 
more resources L t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  t a r i f f ) .  The labour f o r c e  i n  p roduct ive  T 
- 
(economic) use i s  L* = L - (L; + L;), and the  we l fa re  l o s s  due t o  p o l i t i c a l  
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s t r i f e  ( o r  r e n t  seeking) i s  w (L; + L*) (where w i s  t h e  economic va lue K 
o f  labour  t ime) .  
This  model e l e g a n t l y  analyses t h e  endogenous determi n a t i  on o f  t a r i f f s  f rom 
a  t h e o r e t i c a l  and h i g h l y  aggregated p o i n t  o f  view. One o f  i t s  main weak- 
nesses (and one which the  authors a re  w e l l  aware o f )  i s  t h a t  t h e  p u b l i c  
goods charac ter  o f  t a r i f f s  and f r e e  t rade,  and t h e  concomitant f r e e  r i d e r  
e f f e c t ,  a re  n o t  taken i n t o  account. 
The f a c t o r s  i n f l u e n c i n g  t a r i f f  p o l i c y  discussed i n  t he  prev ious pages have 
a l s o  been the  sub jec t  o f  econometric ana l ys i s .  ~ a l d w i n ~ ~ )  seeks t o  e x p l a i n  
t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  a  Congressman v o t i n g  f o r  ( i n d i c a t e d  by a  dummy v a r i a b l e  
t a k i n g  the  va lue 0)  o r  aga ins t  ( t h e  dummy v a r i a b l e  takes t h e  va lue 1 )  ' 
t h e  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i z i n g  b i l l  i n t roduced by a  Republican p res iden t  t o  t h e  
Congress i n  1973. The exp lanatory  va r i ab les  a re  ( i )  t h e  p a r t y  a f f i l i a t i o n  
( i f  t h e  Congressman i s  a  Republican t h e  dummy v a r i a b l e  takes t h e  va lue  1, 
i n  t h e  case o f  a  Democrat, i t  takes the  va lue 0, w i t h  a  nega t i ve  s i g n  ex- 
pected because the  b i l l  i s  in t roduced by a  Republican p res iden t )  ; ( i i )  t he  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  import-sensi t i v e  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  t he  Congressman's c o n s t i  tuen- 
cy  ( w i t h  an expected p o s i t i v e  s ign ) ;  ( i i i )  the  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  expor t -o r ien-  
t e d  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  h i s  cons t i tuency  ( w i t h  an expected nega t i ve  s ign ) ;  and 
( i v )  t he  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  Congressman's campaign made by t h e  t h r e e  major 
unions opposing the  b i  11 (expected p o s i t i v e  s ign)  . The p r o b i  t est imate  
y i e l d s  t he  f o l l o w i n g  equat ion: 
P r o b a b i l i t y  o f  suppor t ing the  1973 t r a d e  b i  11 
= - 0.40 (cons tan t )  
- 1 . 2 0 f *  ( p a r t y a f f i l i a t i o n )  
(6.79) 
+ 3.49** ( import -sensi  t i v e  i n d u s t r i e s )  
(2.62) 
+ 1.16 (expo r t -o r i en ted  i n d u s t r i e s )  
(1.28) 
+ 0.0004** (un ion  campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n )  
(3.22) 
(The values i n  parentheses are  t h e  approximate t -va lues ,  i . e .  
t h e  r a t i o  o f  t he  maximum 1  i ke l  ihood est imate o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  
d i v i ded  by the  standard e r r o r ;  t h e  presence o f  one ( two)  as- 
t e r i s k ( ~ )  i n d i c a t e s  s t a t i s t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  t h e  95% (99%) 
2  According t o  t he  X - t e s t ,  t h e  equat ion i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  99% l e v e l .  
The v a r i a b l e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  p a r t y  a f f i l i a t i o n ,  i r r~por t  s e n s i t i v i t y ,  and un ion  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  a1 1  have t h e  expected s i g n  and a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  expor t -o r ien ted  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  a  Congressman's cons t i tuen-  
cy  has no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n f l u e n c e  on h i s  v o t i n g  behaviour (and 
even has t h e  wrong s ign ) .  Th is  s.uggests .- as hypothesized i n  some o f  t h e  
e a r l i e r  approaches - t h a t  t h e  expor t  i n t e r e s t s  a re  l ess  i n t e n s i v e  and l e s s  
organized than the  import-compet-ir~g i n t e r e s t s ,  who a r e  w e l l  aware o f  t h e  
losses  they  w i l l  i n c u r  from a  lower t a r i f f  b a r r i e r .  
The development o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure by i n t e r e s t  groups i n  t he  Un i ted  
Sta tes  from 1933 t o  1979 i s  analyzed i n  another econo~netr ic  s tudy 46) 
This  pressure i s  ( i n d i r e c t l y )  measured by the  number o f  dumping cases 
f i l e d  w i t h  t h e  U.S. Bureau o f  Customs: t he  (p rospec t i ve  o r  a c t u a l )  losses 
i n c u r r e d  by import-competi ng f i r m s  cause them t o  f i 1 e  dumpi ng charges 
aga ins t  f o re ign  expor ters.  I t  i s  hypothesized t h a t  r i s i n g  unemployment 
combined w i t h  a  d e c l i n e  i n  business a c t i v i t y  and p r o f i t s  r a i s e s  the  expec- 
t ed  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  ( i . e .  the  managers and c a p i t a l  
owners a r e  expected t o  sw i tch  from t h e  area o f  low r e t u r n s ,  economics, t o  
one o f  re1  a t i v e l y  h ighe r  re tu rns ,  po l  i t i c s ) .  As a  consequence, p r o t e c t i o n -  
i s t  pressure i s  thus expected t o  r i s e  w i t h  unemployment. R i s i n g  i n f l a t i o n  
i s  hypothesized t o  lead  t o  pressures from households and consumer groups 
t o  l i b e r a l i z e  imports .  The p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure i s  thus expected t o  de- 
crease w i t h  i nc reas ing  i n f l a t i o n .  
Econometric est imates w i t h  annual da ta  y i e l d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t :  
1  og ( p r o t e c t i o n )  
= - 0.15 (cons tan t )  
- 1.38** (dummy v a r i a b l e )  
(7.54) 
+ 0.92** 1  og (unemployment, percent )  
(6.77) 
- 5.67** ( . i n f l a t i o n ,  percent)  
(3.88) 
R' = 0.72 ( t h e  f i g u r e s  i n  paren theses  are  the  t - va lues )  
The dummy v a r i a b l e  takes t h e  va lue 1  f o r  1933-1952, and 
zero f o r  1953-1977, t o  account f o r  an (unexpl a ined)  
s t r u c t u r a l  s h i f t .  
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The coe f f i c i en ts  f o r  unemployment and i n f l a t i o n  have t h e  expected s igns 
and are  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  A ten-percent increase i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  
unemployment (e.g. from 5% t o  5.5%) i s  associated w i t h  a n ine-percent  i n -  
crease i n  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure; each percentage p o i n t  r i s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  
o f  i n f l a t i o n  (measured us ing  t h e  wholesale p r i c e  index)  (e -g .  f rom 7% t o  
8%) lowers the  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure by 5.7%. F igu re  2 shows t h e  locus  
of constant  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure, which has a p o s i t i v e  slope. 
i n f l a t i o n A  
r a t e  
curves o f  
constant  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure 
I 7 
r a t e  o f  
unempl oyment 
F ig .  2: P r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure as the  r e s u l t  o f  unemployment and i n f l a t i o n  
The f i g u r e  shows t h r e e  l i n e s  o f  constant  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure; t h e  lower 
and f u r t h e r  t o  t h e  r i g h t  such a l i n e  i s  located,  t h e  h igher  i s  t h e  pressure 
f o r  p ro tec t ion ism.  
The econometric o r  po l  i t ome t r i c  es t imate  sketched above may be c r i t i c i z e d  
on var ious  grounds. The behavioura l  assumptions under ly ing  t h e  p o l i t i c o -  
economic model a re  n o t  made s u f f i c i e n t l y  e x p l i c i t .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
t h e  pressure f o r  p ro tec t i on i sm as measured by t h e  number o f  dumping cases 
-25- 
f i l e d  and o the r  types o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  pressure (e.g. on members o f  t h e  
Congress o r  on p u b l i c  admin i s t ra to rs )  remains unexplained. The s p e c i f i c a -  
t i o n  of t h e  es t ima t i on  equat ion i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  because t h e r e  i s  an (un- 
exp la ined)  m ix tu re  o f  1  oga r i  thmic (unemployment) and non- logar i  t h n i c  ( i n -  
f l a t i o n )  q u a n t i t i e s .  
Despi te  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  which niay be r a i s e d  aga ins t  these ( f i r s t )  econometric 
est imates i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy, t h i s  research demonstrates 
t h a t  t h e  hypotheses de r i ved  from t h e o r e t i c a l  models can ( a t  l e a s t  i n  p r i n -  
c i p l e )  be e m p i r i c a l l y  tested.  
Another a c t o r  which p lays an impor tan t  r o l e  i n  t a r i f f  fo rmat ion  i s  t h e  - pub-
lit admin i s t ra t i on .  This  body has considerable i n f l uence  on t h e  "supply 
s i de "  o f  t a r i f f  s e t t i n g  because i t  prepares, formulates, and implements 
t r a d e  b i l l s  once a  dec i s i on  has been made by government and par l iament .  
The a c t i v i t y  o f  pub1 i c  bureaucrats w i t h  respec t  t o  t a r i f f s  may be analyzed 
w i t h  t h e  he lp  o f  t he  " r a t i o n a l "  model o f  behaviour, e.g. by maximizing 
u t i  1  i ty sub jec t  t o  constra ints4 ' ) .  The main elements i n  t h e  bureaucrats  ' 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  may be assumed t o  be t h e  p res t i ge ,  power and i n f l u e n c e  
which they enjoy r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  group o f  people they a r e  o f f i c i a l l y  de- 
s igned t o  "serve",  t h e i r  c l i e n t e l e .  I n  most cases t h i s  c l i e n t e l e  w i l l  be 
l o c a t e d  i n  a  s p e c i f i c  economic sec tor ,  e.g. i n  t h e  case o f  p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l s  
i n  t he  M i n i s t r y  of A g r i c u l t u r e  t he  c l i e n t e l e  would be those groups w i t h  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n t e r e s t s .  They a r e  moreover proud o f  being a b l e  t o  show t h a t  
t hey  a re  competent t o  per form t h e i r  j o b  ("performance exce l l ence " ) .  P u b l i c  
bureaucrats  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  tend t o  f i g h t  f o r  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  " t h e i r "  eco- 
nomic sec tor ,  and w i l l  work f o r  t a r i f f s  and o ther  import  r e s t r i c t i o n s  i n  
order  t o  p r o t e c t  i t  from outs ide  compet i t ion.  They w i l l  p r e f e r  t o  use i n -  
struments under t h e i r  own c o n t r o l  r a t h e r  than t o  f o l l o w  general r u l e s  i m -  
posed by formal laws. They w i l l  thus p r e f e r  var ious k inds o f  n o n - t a r i f f  
p r o t e c t i o n  and support (subs id ies)  t o  general t a r i f f s .  
The c o n s t r a i n t s  faced by the  p u b l i c  bureaucracy are  imposed by par l iament  
and government. However, both o f  these actors have l i t t l e  i n c e n t i v e  t o  con- 
t r o l  p u b l i c  admin i s t ra t i on  more t i g h t l y ,  because they a re  dependent on i t  
i n  order  t o  reach t h e i r  own goals. I n  add i t ion ,  the  p o l i t i c a l  ac to rs  have 
much l e s s  in fo rmat ion  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them than the  p u b l i c  bureaucracy, i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  w i t h  respect  t o  t he  sometimes very complex issues o f  p ro tec t i on .  
The 1  i m i  t e d  i n c e n t i v e  o f  pol i t i c i a n s  t o  con t ro l  t he  pub1 i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
g ives  bureaucrats considerable d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power which they  use t o  t h e i r  
own advantage. 
Pub l i c  Choice theory has a l so  been used t o  t ry  t o  exp la in  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p ro tec t i on ,  i .e .  t he  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t a r i f f s  between i n d u s t r i e s .  
It i s  hypothesized t h a t  t he  more concentrated i n d u s t r i e s  f i n d  i t  eas ie r  t o  
organize and t o  muster p o l i t i c a l  pressure because a  smal le r  number o f  
en te rp r i ses  i s  more w i l l i n g  t o  bear t he  t ransac t ion ,  o rgan iza t i on  and l ob -  
by ing  cos ts  invo lved i n  g e t t i n g  t a r i f f  p ro tec t ion .  This  hypothesis  has been 
e m p i r i c a l l y  analyzed by ~ i n c u s ~ ~ )  f o r  t he  U.S. t a r i f f  a c t  o f  1824. He f i n d s  
t h a t  a  h igher  i n d u s t r i a l  concent ra t ion  o f  output  i s  indeed associated w i t h  
a  h igher  t a r i f f  l e v e l ,  a l l  o ther  in f luences being constant.  
Another s tudy by Caves 49) examines th ree  competing models i n  order  t o  
f i n d  the  one bes t  ab le  t o  e x p l a i n  the  e x i s t i n g  t a r i f f  s t ruc tu res :  i n  the  
f i r s t  model the  government maximizes t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  winning the  e l e c t i o n  
g iven a  geograph ica l l y  represented e lec tora te ;  i n  t h e  second model i n t e r e s t  
groups determine t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t a r i f f s ,  the  var ious i n d u s t r i e s  having 
d i f f e r e n t  b e n e f i t s  and cos ts  o f  lobbying f o r  p ro tec t i on ;  and i n  t he  t h i r d  
model t he  government se ts  t a r i f f s  i n  an attempt t o  produce a  c o l l e c t i v e  
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  f e e l i n g  about t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  composit ion o f  t he  economy 
( "na t i ona l  pol  i c y  model " )  . 
A1 though the  th ree  models are no t  mutua l ly  exc lus ive,  they emphasize d i f -  
f e r e n t  pol i t ico-economic processes f o r  t a r i f f  s e t t i n g .  An econometric com- 
par ison w i t h  Canada's t a r i f f  r a t e  s t r u c t u r e  i n  1963 broad ly  supports the 
i n t e r e s t  groups model. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r e s t  group exp lanat ion  o f  Canada's t a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e  by 
He1 l e i n e r S 0 )  s t resses i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  in f luences.  A t ime se r ies  
ana lys i s  f o r  t he  pe r iod  1961 -1 970 suggests t h a t  labour  and mu1 t i n a t i o n a l  
f i r m s  have the  l a r g e s t  i n f l u e n c e  on t a r i f f s :  labour  seeks increased pro- 
t e c t i o n  because o f  t he  r i s i n g  supply o f  i n d u s t r i a l  products from low- 
wage count r ies ,  w h i l e  mu1 t i n a t i o n a l s  a re  i n te res ted  i n  f r e e  t rade.  S i m i l a r  
s tud ies  have been undertaken f o r  o the r  countr ies5 ' ) .  These s tud ies  on the  
determinants o f  the t a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e  may by c r i t i c i z e d  because t h e  under- 
l y i n g  behavioural  theory  o f  t he  government and i n t e r e s t  groups i s  n o t  
spel l e d  o u t  expl i c i  t l y  . Rather, t he  es t imat ion  equations are de r i ved  from 
an imp1 i c i  t theory o f  t he  po l  i t ico-economic process. Nevertheless , the 
analyses represent  an impor tan t  advance over, on the  one hand, attempts 
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t o  use a  pu re l y  economic approach t o  exp la in  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n ,  and on the  
o ther ,  t o  a t t r i b u t e  i t  t o  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  alone. 
The preceding d iscuss ion  o f  t h e  var ious  f a c t o r s  which may be used t o  ex- 
p l a i n  t a r i f f s  and o t h e r  t r a d e  r e s t r i c t i o n s  shows t h a t  t h e  s tudy o f  i n t e r -  
na t i ona l  p o l i t i c a l  economy based on Pub l i c  Choice i s  w e l l  under way, and 
t h a t  useful  t h e o r e t i c a l  and empi r i ca l  r e s u l t s  have been achieved us ing  an 
approach which d i f f e r s  s t r o n g l y  from p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s '  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Pol i t i c a l  Economy. The research i s ,  however, o n l y  a t  a  very  e a r l y  stage 
and t h e r e  a re  var ious  aspects o f  t h e  ana lys is  which must be improved. One 
i s  t h a t  t h e  behaviour of t h e  ac to rs  (government, i n t e r e s t  groups and pub- 
1  i c  bureaucracy) must be model l e d  more ca re fu l  l y ,  t a k i n g  t h e i r  cha rac te r i s -  
t i c  preferences and c o n s t r a i n t s  i n t o  account; a  second i s  t h a t  t h e  equa- 
t i o n s  used f o r  econometric es t ima t i on  should be more c l o s e l y  and cons i s ten t -  
l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  models; a  t h i r d  i s  t h a t  t h e  framework o f  
t he  ana l ys i s  should be extended, so t h a t  a l l  t h e  r e l e v a n t  causal r e l a t i o n -  
sh ips  can be i nc luded  i n  t h e  ana lys is .  Not o n l y  do po l i t i co -economic  con- 
d i t i o n s  a f fec t  t a r i f f s ,  bu t  t a r i f f s  a l s o  a f f e c t  t he  s t a t e  of t h e  economy 
and p o l i t y .  Thus, both d i r e c t i o n s  o f  interdependence between t a r i f f s  and 
the  p o l i t i c a l  economy should be considered. 
2. Fore ign d i r e c t  investment 
There i s  a  g rea t  amount of l . i t e r a t u r e ,  both t h e o r e t i c a l  and emp i r i ca l ,  
deal i n g  w i t h  t he  economic aspects o f  f o r e i g n  investment5'). However, very few 
s tud ies  seem t o  recognize t h a t  t h e  ex ten t  and d i r e c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  
investment depends on bo th  economic - and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s .  I t  has been 
hypothesized t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  discourages f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t -  
ment. The empi r ica l  evidence i s  r a t h e r  mixed. Most s tud ies  based on survey 
research s t ress  t h e  negat ive e f f e c t  o f  pol i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l  i ty, b u t  o ther  
scholars f i n d  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  cond i t i ons  a re  o f  minimal concern t o  inves-  
t o r ~ ~ ~ ) .  This  type o f  research i s  r a t h e r  impress ion i s t i c ,  unsystematic and 
tends t o  be s u p e r f i c i a l  . 
There a r e  several s tud ies  based on s t a t i s t i c a l  analyses. Much has been 
w r i t t e n  on " P o l i t i c a l  Risk" and on t h e  "Investment Cl imate" by business 
 economist^^^). A g rea t  number o f  d i f f e r e n t  measures have been developed by 
pol  i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  t he  bes t  known being the  B E R I  (Business Environment 
Risk Index) ,  which has been computed q u a r t e r l y  f o r  45 coun t r i es  s ince  
1972. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  cross-sect ion s tud ies  us ing  such r i s k  i nd i ces  have 
55 found t h a t  pol i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  e i t h e r  exer ts  no s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  , 
o r  a  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  b u t  small e f f e c t  on f o r e i g n  i n v e ~ t m e n t ~ ~ ) .  Time se r ies  
s tud ies  have i n  general shown t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  has a  negat ive  
e f f e c t  on f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e ~ t m e n t ~ ~ ) .  According t o  an extensive ana lys i s  
by ~ h u n e l l ~ ~ ) ,  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  does no t  a f f e c t  the  l e v e l  b u t  on l y  
t h e  t rend  i n  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  investment.  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  asymmetrical: 
a  h igh  l e v e l  o f  mass v io lence precedes a  t rend away from investment,  w h i l e  
i t  takes both a  1  ow 1  eve1 o f  v io lence and a  change i n  government ( i  .e. a  
new p o l i c y )  t o  generate a  t rend  towards investment. 
These s tud ies  can a1 1  be c r i t i c i z e d  on c e r t a i n  grounds: 
F i r s t ,  what mat ters i s  the  i n v e s t o r s '  expected cos t  from p a r t i c u l a r  pol i t i-  
c a l  cond i t ions ,  n o t  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  as such. Even w i t h  a  sharp change 
i n  the  na ture  o f  t h e  p o l i t i ~ o - e c o n o m i c  system, f o r e i g n  investments w i l l  do t  
necessa r i l y  be na t i ona l i zed .  Even i f  t h i s  happens, t h e  owners a r e  u s u a l l y  
l a r g e l y  compensated f o r  t h e i r  losses.  " P o l i t i c a l  r i s k "  has t o  be more 
care fu l  l y  defined. Secondly, o n l y  a smal l  number o f  f o r ced  divestments 
have occurred i n  t h e  l a s t  20 years, so t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  on l y  a few observa- 
t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  ana lys is .  The r i s k  o f  e x p r o p r i a t i o n  v a r i e s  
cons iderab ly  betwsen economic sec tors  and even between f i rms5') .  Aggregate 
r i s k  i n d i c a t o r s  may n o t  capture t h i s  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e f f e c t  o f  i nves t~ i i en t  r i s k ,  
and t h i s  may lead t o  f a l se  conclusions. T h i r d l y ,  t he  s t u d i e s  do n o t  bear i n  
mind t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  f o r e i g n  i nves to rs  may be a b l e  t o  i n s u r e  aga ins t  
60 losses, o r  t h a t  they may g e t  investment guarantees i n  t h e i r  home coun t r y  . 
The most impor tan t  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t he  s tud ies  mentioned above r e l a t e  t o  
ser ious  method01 og i ca l  weaknesses. No e f f o r t  i s  made t o  check f o r  economic 
i n f l uences  when s tudy ing  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  determinants. Such a procedure i s  
necessary because i t  would be unwise t o  assume t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  a r e  
t h e  only ,  o r  even t h e  main, determinants o f  t h e  f lows o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  
investment. A c o r r e c t  a n a l y s i s  would consider t he  impact o f  bo th  p o l i t i c a l  
and economic va r i ab les  s imul taneously ,  e.g. by runn ing  a m u l t i p l e  regres-  
-
s ion .  An example o f  t h i s  procedure i s  g iven by ~ u n n i n ~ ~ ' )  who simultaneous- 
l y  considers a mu1 ti tude o f  f a c t o r s .  The r e s u l t s  are, however, d i f f i c u l t  
t o  i n t e r p r e t ,  and t h e  author  does n o t  come forward w i t h  any i n t u i t i v e l y  
comprehensi b l  e r e s u l  t s  . 
Stud ies  o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  investment s t i l l  l a c k  a sound t h e o r e t i c a l  frame- 
work. Th is  i s  obv ious ly  an area i n  which (business) economists have been 
very  ac t i ve ,  b u t  i n  which t h e  economic o r  ' r a t i o n a l  ' approach has n o t  been 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  developed. What i s  needed i s  an expl i c i  t model o f  t h e  behaviour 
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of investors (usual ly mu1 tinational firms), governments and pub1 ic bureau- 
cracy (in b o t h  investing and host countries), and of international insti- 
tuti ons. A model of this type would he1 p to overcome the overly empiri - 
cis t  bias of current studies. 
3 .  International aid 
The self-interest model developed in Public Choice may also be applied t o  
behaviour in the field of international aid. Voters are n o t  very interes- 
ted in the aid going t o  foreign countries because they derive a t  best an 
indirect and non-monetary benefit from i t ,  and they therefore make l i t t l e  
effort t o  become well-informed on this issue. Few interest groups push for 
more aid, and compared t o  industrial pressure groups such as trade unions 
or producers' organizations they are much less tightly organized and  have 
much smaller financial resources. The government i s  therefore able t o  use 
this discretionary room t o  further i t s  own goals via international aid, 
in particular with regard t o  foreign policy. A country's "international 
standing" may be an important issue. I n  an international or general set- 
ting a government will tend t o  speak o u t  for international aid b u t  i t  will 
n o t  make any firm commitments62). On the other hand, when financial deci- 
sions have t o  be made, the government will be rather reluctant t o  grant a 
large amount of international aid because i t  usually benefits more from a1 - 
locating the funds t o  groups within the country. 
The recipient countries may actively influence the amount of aid given t o  
them by donor countries who  are interested in their support in the inter- 
national sphere. A country i s  likely t o  receive l i t t l e  aid if  i t  already 
supports the  donor country  p o l i t i c a l l y ,  o r  i f  i t  w i l l  n o t  support t he  
donor country  under any circumstances. It can expect t o  g e t  the  h ighes t  
amount o f  a i d  if i t  makes c l e a r  t h a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  i t  w i l l  take 
depends on the  amount o f  a i d  granted. A country  wishing t o  maximize 
the amount o f  f o r e i g n  a i d  i t  receives should thus n o t  be a  permanent mem- 
ber  o f  any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b loc  b u t  should r a t h e r  s i g n i f y  t h a t  i t  can be 
,163) 
"b r ibed . 
4. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  organi  z a t i  ons 
I n t e r e s t i n g  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  have been made w i t h i n  Pub l ic  Choice t o  the  study 
of t h e  b e n e f i t s  and cos ts  o f  j o i n i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  , t h e i r  
dec i s ion  ru les ,  and t h e i r  i n t e r n a l  bureaucracy, as we1 1  as t o  t h e  study o f  
barga in ing  i n  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e t t i n g .  
4.1. Bene f i t s  and cos ts  o f  j o i n i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  
An i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ion  may perform var ious serv ices : i t  may prov ide  
p u b l i c  goods and serv ices,  coord inate the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  ac tors  i n  the  i n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  system, and form an i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e t t i n g  f o r  a1 1  iances . I n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  may a l s o  be used t o  f u r t h e r  p r i v a t e  ( i  .e. n a t i o -  
n a l )  aims; i t  would the re fo re  be a  mistake t o  assume t h a t  they maximize 
the  c o l l e c t i v e  economic we l fa re  e i t h e r  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
count ry  o r  o f  the  wor ld  as a  whole. 
Much o f  t h e  ou tput  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organizat ions has the  charac ter  o f  a  
p u b l i c  good, which prov ides an i ncen t i ve  f o r  coun t r i es  t o  behave as f r e e  
r i d e r s .  Under these circumstances the  organ iza t ion  w i l l  no t  be ab le  t o  
operate e f f e c t i v e l y  unless: ( i )  i t  i nvo lves  o n l y  a  small group o f  count r ies ,  
p e r m i t t i n g  d i r e c t  i n t e r a c t i o n  and imposing h igh  cos ts  on f r e e  r i d e r s ;  o r  
( i  i ) p r i v a t e  goods are  o f f e r e d  s e l e c t i v e l y  t o  t h e  members o f  t he  organiza-  
t i o n ,  p rov id ing  an i n c e n t i v e  f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  coun t r i es  t o  j o i n  and p a r t i c -  
i p a t e  i n  t he  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t he  organ iza t ion ;  o r  ( i i i )  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  
64 achieved by coerc ion  . 
It has been empi r i ca l  l y  shown t h a t  smal l  , especia l  l y  reg iona l  , i n t e r n a t i o -  
n a l  o rgan iza t ions  a re  indeed more successful  than l a r g e  ones65). Crea t ing  
s e l e c t i v e  i ncen t i ves  f o r  members i s  very  common i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organiza-  
t i o n s .  The ex is tence o f  such p r i v a t e  goods i s  a  very impor tan t  barga in ing  
t o o l  used by governments i n  persuading par1 iaments t o  agree t o  j o i n .  Con- 
s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  devoted t o  t rans forming  p u b l i c  goods i n t o  
p r i v a t e  goods owned by t h e  organ iza t ion66) .  Coercion i s  d i f f i c u l t  and o f t e n  
i r r~poss ib le  i n  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  context ,  because t h e  member c o u n t r i e s  a r e  
u n w i l l i n g  t o  g i v e  up t h e i r  independence. The assumption t h a t  coerc ion  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t h e r e f o r e  so lves the  problem of i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o ~ g a n i z a t i o n s  by 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  as long  as t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system i s  composed o f  sovere ign 
s t a t e s  . 
An o r g a n i z a t i o n  may a l s o  be formed i f  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  p a r t i c i p a n t s '  percep- 
t i o n  of t h e  advantages o f  membership and the  s o c i a l  pressure t o  belong t o  i t  
can be increased by educat ion and propaganda. As i n  t he  case o f  coerc ion,  
t h i s  approach has very l i t t l e  chance of success i n  t he  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system. 
The pathbreaking c o n t r i b u t i o n  by Olson and zeckhauser6') takes defence t o  
be a  t y p i c a l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p u b l i c  good prov ided by NATO. The b e n e f i t s  go 
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t o  a l l  democracies, and e s p e c i a l l y  t o  the  European members which are  
nearer t o  t he  (1  i k e l y )  f r o n t  1  i n e  than the  Uni ted States. Due t o  t h e  i n -  
c e n t i v e  f o r  f r e e  r i d i n g ,  t he  small na t i ons .  c o n t r i b u t e  a  d i sp ropo r t i ona te -  
l y  low share o f  t he  cost,  w h i l e  the  l a r g e  nat ions,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  Un i ted  
States, bear a  d i sp ropo r t i ona te l y  h igh  share (even a l lowing f o r  t h e  h ighe r  
pe r  c a p i t a  GNP). The same p r i n c i p l e  holds f o r  t he  UN, where the  l a r g e  
coun t r i es  have made a  b e t t e r  job  o f  meeting and o v e r f u l f i l l i n g  t h e i r  quotas 
than t h e  small e r  nat ions.  
A more recen t  o f  t he  fo rmat i  on o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  
takes t h e  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  bT and the  t o t a l  costs cT as a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he  
amount o f  i t s  cooperat ive a c t i v i t y  o r  output  Q. Each na t i on  i s  t r e a t e d  as 
an i n d i v i d u a l  ac to r  i who i s  t r y i n g  t o  maximize i t s  own n e t  ga in  gi, t he  
d i f f e r e n c e  between i n d i v i d u a l  b e n e f i t s  bi and i n d i v i d u a l  cos ts  ci . Taking 
B  t o  be count ry  i ' s  share i n  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  (B = bi/bT) and C t o  be i t s  
share i n  t o t a l  costs ( C  = ci/cT), the  opt imal amount o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ac- 
t i v i t y  i s  g iven by 
The l e f t - h a n d  s i d e  shows the  marginal p o l i c y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  depending on t h e  
r e l a t i v e  shares i n  t o t a l  b e n e f i t s  and costs (B/C), the  r igh t -hand s i d e  the  
marginal  cos t  o f  t he  o rgan iza t i on ' s  output .  The e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  shown i n  
F igure  3. 
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Fig .  3: Organizat ional  equi 1  i b r i u m  
Empi r ica l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the  model has shown t h a t  t he  marginal c o s t  curve 
r i s e s  s teep ly ;  t h i s  i s  because i t  becomes inc reas ing l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  reach 
agreement, and t o  take the i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l  p a r t i e s  i n t o  account, as the  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t i on ' s  a c t i v i t y  expands. The marginal po l  i c y  c o n t r i  - 
b u t i o n  curve (MPC) i s  found t o  f a l l  s teep ly .  Moving from the  "Group o f  
F ive"  coun t r i es  (US, UK, FRG, France, Japan) t o  the  "Big Seven" (adding 
Canada and I t a l y ) ,  t o  the  "Group o f  Ten" (which a l so  inc ludes Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Sweden), t o  t he  OECD (which inc ludes t h i r t e e n  a d d i t i o -  
n a l  coun t r i es )  adds a  successively  d imin ish ing  amount t o  t he  b e n e f i t s  r e -  
ce ived by each count ry  (assumed t o  be p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h a t  coun t r y ' s  
share i n  wor ld  GNP o r  i n  wor ld t rade) .  The authors conclude t h a t  because 
the  r a t i o  B/C has f a l l e n  s t r o n g l y  f o r  the  Uni ted States, t h i s  count ry  has 
a  smal le r  i n t e r e s t  i n  the  p u b l i c  goods produced by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organiza- 
t i o n s  ( i  .e. i t s  e q u i l i b r i u m  has moved t o  the l e f t  because o f  a  downward 
s h i f t  i n  t he  MPC-curve i n  F igure  3) .  On the  o ther  hand, the  B/C  r a t i o  has 
increased f o r  nations such as Japan, Germany, the Benelux countries or  
the  European Community, leading t o  a  demand fo r  international  organiza- 
t ions  t o  increase t h e i r  output. 
Another imp1 icat ion of the  model i s  t h a t  large international  organizations 
have become l e s s  e f fec t ive  because the  share of the benef i ts  taken by the  
dom-inant country (formerly the United Kingdom, now the United S t a t e s )  has 
decreased, leading t o  l e s s  cooperation. Instead of a  "leader" providing 
in ternat ional  public goods part ly i n  i t s  own i n t e r e s t ,  the dominant force 
is  now a  group of r e l a t i ve ly  small countries,  each of which i s  unwilling 
69 t o  provide public goods . 
The model out1 ined above provides an in teres t ing formalization of the sys- 
tem but i t  i s  s t i l l  only a  f i r s t  s t ep  towards an economic theory of i n t e r -  
national organizations. The operational i z a t i  on of the theoret ical  concepts 
is  r a the r  weak, par t i cu la r ly  w i t h  respect t o  the  measurement of benef i t s .  
4.2. Decision ru les  i n  international  organizations 
The formal ru les  defining how decisions are  t o  be taken w i t h i n  an ( i n t e r -  
nat ional)  organization can have an important e f f ec t  on the  (expected) 
cos t s  of providing a  public good, from the  point of view of an individual 
country. Consider Figure 4 ,  which is  an extension of Figure 3 ,  
Fig .  4: The e f f e c t  o f  a1 t e r n a t i v e  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  
Given t h e  marginal b e n e f i t  o r  marginal p o l i c y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  curve, t h e  ou t -  
p u t  o f  t h e  o rgan i za t i on  Q opt imal  f rom t h e  p o i n t  o f  view o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
coun t r y  dec l i nes  from Ql when dec is ions  a re  taken by s imple m a j o r i t y ,  t o  
Qp when a  qua1 i f i e d  m a j o r i t y  i s  requ i red ,  and t o  Q3 when t h e  d e c i s i o n  has 
t o  be unanimous. The reason i s  t h a t  t h e  marginal cos t  curve s h i f t s  up- 
wards and t o  t h e  l e f t  due t o  t h e  i nc reas iqg  cos t  o f  d e c i s i o n  making: i t  be- 
comes more and more d i f f i c u l t  t o  reach an agreement as t h e  r u l e s  become 
s t r i c t e r  ( w i t h  t h e  unan imi ty  r u l e  everyone can b lock  a  dec i s i on )  and t h e  
70 i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  o the r  members must i n c r e a s i n g l y  be taken i n t o  account . 
The number o f  vo te rs  from a  p a r t i c u l a r  count ry  ( o r  group o f  c o u n t r i e s ) ,  
g i ven  t h e  formal d e c i s i o n  r u l e ,  determines t h e  "power" of t h a t  count ry  
w i t h i n  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ion .  "Power" - which i s  gene ra l l y  q u i t e  an 
e l u s i v e  concept - may be def ined i n  an opera t iona l  way t o  be the  chance 
of a f fec t ing  t h e  outcome o f  a  dec is ion .  A dec is ion  i s  i n f l uenced  by con- 
t r o l  of t he  " p i v o t a l "  vote, i .e. i f  one i s  ab le  t o  t rans form a  non-winning 
c o a l i t i o n  (e.g. a  m i n o r i t y  i n  t he  case o f  simple m a j o r i t y  v o t i n g )  i n t o  a  
winning c o a l i t i o n  ( a  m a j o r i t y ) .  A number o f  d i f f e r e n t  power i nd i ces  based 
on t h i s  concept have been developed i n  game theory.  Using t h e  Bhanzhaf i n -  
dex, i t  has been shown7') t h a t  t he  recent  change i n  v o t i n g  r u l e s  a t  t h e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Flonetary Fund, which became e f f e c t i v e  i n  1978, has r e s u l t e d  
i n  a  s u r p r i s i n g ,  c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e  change i n  t h e  power s t r u c t u r e :  four 
major coun t r i es  (Federal Republ i c  o f  Germany, Japan, The Nether1 ands and 
Belgium) whose vo te  was increased t o  keep pace w i t h  t h e i r  increased weight  
i n  t he  wor ld  economy, su f fe red  a  dec l i ne  i n  power, w h i l e  38 coun t r i es  
whose vote was reduced experienced an increase i n  power. 
4.3. The bureaucracy o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  orqanizat ions 
It has been suggested t h a t  t he  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  bureaucracies are more 
pronounced i n  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  than i n  the  na t i ona l  s e t t i n g .  The main 
reason f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  they have g rea te r  room f o r  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  a c t i o n  
because t h e r e  i s  n e i t h e r t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  nor  the  i n c e n t i v e  t o  c o n t r o l  them. 
Contro l  i s  d i f f i c u l t  because the  "output"  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t i on  
i s  undef ined and cannot u s u a l l y  be measured. There a re  no po l  i t i c a l  i n s t i  - 
t u t i o n s  which would ga in  by t i g h t l y  c o n t r o l  1  i n g  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organiza- 
t i o n :  na t i ona l  governments would on l y  run  i n t o  t r o u b l e  w i t h  o the r  na t i ona l  
governments i f  they t r i e d  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  t h e  workings o f  such i n s t i t u -  
t i o n s .  They the re fo re  p r e f e r  t o  l e t  t h ings  go and on l y  i n te rvene  i f  they 
f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  own na t i ona ls  employed i n  t h e  organ iza t ion  a r e  being un- 
f a i r l y  t r e a t e d  o r  t h a t  t h e i r  na t iona l  i n t e r e s t s  are being threatened by 
the  o rgan iza t i on ' s  a c t i v i t y .  The l ack  o f  incent ives  i s  another example o f  
t he  f r e e  r i d i n g  problem. 
Due t o  the  l a c k  o f  e f f e c t i v e  con t ro l  i n  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ion ,  
none o f  t he  l aye rs  i n  t he  h ie rarchy  has any r e a l  i n c e n t i v e  t o  work t o -  
wards the  " o f f i c i a l  product"  because t h e i r  u t i l i t y  depends h a r d l y  a t  a l l  
on t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  The na t i ona l  quotas f o r  a  g rea t  number o f  p o s i t i o n s  
t h a t  a re  a  fea tu re  o f  many i n t e r n a t i o n a l  organizat ions d r i v e  a  f u r t h e r  
wedge between the  i n d i v i d u a l  s '  u t i l  i t y  and the  o rgan iza t i on ' s  o f f i c i a l  
f unc t i on .  This p a r t i c u l a r  i n c e n t i v e  s t r u c t u r e  leads t o  a  growth o f  the  i n -  
t e r n a t i o n a l  bureaucracies q u i t e  independent o f  the  tasks t o  be performed, 
because a l l  bureaucrats b e n e f i t  from l a r g e r  budgets and a  g rea te r  number 
o f  empl oyees7'). I n t e r n a t i o n a l  bureaucracies a re  a1 so charac ter ized by a  
low degree o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and a  pro fus ion  o f  red  tape because t h e  fo rmal ized 
i n t e r n a l  workings o f  t h e  organ iza t ion  become dominant. A considerable 
share o f  the  budget w i l l  be used f o r  i n t e r n a l  purposes, and t o  prov ide 
s i d e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  the  bureaucrats themsel ves . 
This  theory o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bureaucracy has s t i l l  t o  undergo empi r ica l  
t e s t i n g .  
4.4. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  barga in ing  
Model1 i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bargain ing i s  a  more formidable task due t o  the  
f a c t  t h a t  the  process has 1  i t t l e  s t r u c t u r e  and invo lves  many var iab les .  
There have t h e r e f o r e  been few Pub l ic  Choice s tud ies  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  bar-  
gain ing,  each o f  which has concentrated on a  p a r t i c u l a r  aspect o f  the  problem. 
I n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  nego t i a t i ons ,  l i nkages  between var ious  i ssues  a r e  q u i t e  
a  common fea tu re .  I t  has been shown73) t h a t  l i n kages  a r e  more i m p o r t a n t  
when t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  f rom agreements i s  h i g h l y  b iased  towards 
a  smal l  number o f  coun t r i es .  The l i n k a g e  o f  i ssues  whose d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  
consequences o f f s e t  each o t h e r  can h e l p  promote agreements which would 
o the rw i se  f a i l  because o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e f f e c t s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, 
1  i nkages p l a y  a  smal l  r o l e  when t h e  b e n e f i t s  f rom an agreement a r e  con- 
s i d e r e d  t o  be " f a i r l y "  d i s t r i b u t e d  across coun t r i es .  I n  t h i s  case a  con- 
sensus can be reached w i t h o u t  i n t r o d u c i n g  an a d d i t i o n a l  dimension i n  t h e  
form o f  l i n k e d  issues. These r e s u l t s  a r e  p l a u s i b l e  b u t  aga in  have n o t  y e t  
been e m p i r i c a l l y  tested.  
I V .  Concluding Remarks 
The aim o f  t h i s  survey was t o  show t h a t  P u b l i c  Choice economists have made 
cons ide rab le  and va luab le  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  i n  t he  area o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l  i- 
t i c a l  economy. This  approach has shed some new l i g h t  on t h e  f i e l d  and 
shou ld  be o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  a1 1  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i s t s  concerned wi-th b r i d g i n g  t h e  
gap between i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economics and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  ( p o l  i t i c a l  ) r e1  a- 
t i o n s .  Due t o  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  space, t h i s  survey has o n l y  been a b l e  t o  
p r o v i d e  some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  examples, and some se lec ted  f i e l d s  o f  a p p l i c a -  
t i o n ,  o f  t h e  Pub1 i c  Choice approach t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy. 
Other t h e o r e t i c a l  concepts w i  11 doubt1 ess,ly be appl i e d  , and addi  ti onal  prob- 
1  em areas covered, i n  the  f u t u r e .  
The economic approach t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy has b o t h  s t r e n g t h s  
and weaknesses (which i s  t r u e  f o r  - any approach, i n c l u d i n g  t h a t  adopted by 
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pol i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s )  : 
F i r s t .  The Pub l ic  Choice view provides f resh  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  the  area, i n  
t he  same way t h a t  t he  economics-based approach ill uminated general pol i- 
t i c s .  This  does not ,  o f  course, mean t h a t  t h i s  approach i s  supe r io r  t o  any 
o the r  b u t  r a t h e r  t h a t  i t  i s  ab le  t o  i l l u m i n a t e  p a r t i c u l a r  aspects o f  i n t e r -  
na t i ona l  p o l i t i c a l  economy ( w h i l e  being unable t o  c o n t r i b u t e  much i n  o ther  
areas) .  As w i l l  become c l e a r  from these concluding remarks, t h e  s p e c i f i c  
s t rengths  o f  t h e  Pub l i c  Choice view a r e  a lso  responsib le f o r  i t s  s p e c i f i c  
weaknesses. This i s  a l s o  t r u e  when consider ing t h e  advantage o f  app ly ing  
a  new method t o  an a l ready es tab l ished f i e l d ,  such as I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i -  
c a l  Economy. There i s  a  tendency t o  use t h e o r e t i c a l  and emp i r i ca l  methods 
w i t h o u t  paying s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  h i s t o r i c a l  and i n -  
s t i t u t i o n a l  cond i t i ons  e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  study. A qu ick  a p p l i c a t i o n  
i s  tempt ing because i t  i s  seemingly easy t o  undertake, and the  sho r t -  
comings o f  t he  ana lys i s  may n o t  be obvious. It i s  necessary, however, t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  thoroughly whether 'a p a r t i c u l a r  t h e o r e t i c a l  concept (such as 
p u b l i c  goods and f r e e  r i d i n g )  r e a l l y  captures t h e  essent ia l  fea tures  o f  
r e a l  i ty . 
Second. An advantage o f  t h e  economic approach t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  pol  i t i c a l  
economy i s  t h a t  t h e  ana lys is  i s  based on an e x p l i c i t  and u n i f i e d  theory  o f  
human behavi our, and on a  techn i  ca l  apparatus capabl e  o f  produci ng t h e o r e t i  - 
c a l  s o l u t i o n s  and empi r ica l  l y  t e s t a b l e  proposi t ions.  This  t echn ica l  elegance 
leads, however, t o  a  tendency t o  s a c r i f i c e  relevance f o r  r i g o u r .  There are  
a1 ready some areas o f  economists ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy where t h e  
heavy f o r m a l i s t i c  apparatus used i s  o u t  o f  a l l  p ropo r t i on  t o  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
advances i n  know1 edge. 
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T h i r d .  The economic approach concentrates on spec i f ic  aspects of i n t e r -  
national po l i t i ca l  economy, making i t  possible t o  i so l a t e  and analyse 
r e l a t i ve ly  simple relat ionships.  The high degree of abstraction allows 
the  economist t o  gain major insights in to  co~iiplex problem areas b u t  a l so  
involves the  danger of leaving out relevant aspects or of keeping constant 
(by the  " ce t e r i s  paribus" assumption) variables which a re  so c losely  and 
importantly connected with the problem studied t h a t  they should r ea l l y  be 
an endogenous part  of the model. While t h i s  survey has concentrated on 
micro-analytical and par t ia l  analyses, i t  has been shown tha t  there  a re  approa- 
ches w i t h i n  Pub1 i c  Choice which attempt t o  provide an overall view ( i n  
par t i cu la r  the  pol i tico-economic models) . 
Fourth. The emphasis on deriving propositions which a r e  a t  l e a s t  i n  p r i n -  
c i p l e  amenable t o  empirical tes t ing i s  heal thy because i t  forces r e a l i t y  
on the  researcher.  The econometric, or  ra ther  pol i tometric, analyses a l so  
provide important factual  know1 edge about the re1 a t i  ons h i  ps between the  
variables studied.  The disadvantage of t h i s  empirical or ienta t ion i s  t h a t  
aspects d i f f i c u l t  ( o r  impossible) t o  measure quant i ta t ively  a re  ea s i l y  
excluded and tha t  the  relat ionships fo r  which data a r e  eas i ly  avai lable  
a r e  those t ha t  tend t o  be studied. A common shortcoming of empirical eco- 
nomic research is  t ha t  the  operational i z a t i  on of individual theor ies  i s  
often done i n  a ra ther  caval ier  way. In t ha t  respect economists could cer-  
t a i n ly  learn from quant i ta t ive  po l i t i ca l  s c i e n t i s t s ,  a s  well as from other 
socia l  s c i e n t i s t s .  
Empirical research has so f a r  been predominantly concerned with the  United 
S ta tes .  This makes i t  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  evaluate the contribution of eco- 
nomists to  international pol i t i ca l  econoliiy because i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
know what part of the results i s  due to  the Public Choice view, and what 
part t o  the particular conditions obtaining in the United States.  I t  i s  
therefore important that  empirical t e s t s  of the theories should also be 
undertaken for  other nations. 
Fifth.  The Public Choice view i s  interdisciplinary in a specif ic  sense of 
the word: i t  combines the economic and polit ical  aspects of international 
pol i t i c a l  economy b u t  uses only - one theoretical approach. (Usual ly , inter-  
d isc ip l inar i ty  i s  understood to mean that  theoretical approaches have to-be 
combined.) This has the advantage that  the two areas can be fused together, 
b u t  i t  carr ies  the (a1 ready mentioned) danger that  only some aspects of 
the interrelat ionship will be treated. There can be l i t t l e  doubt< how- 
ever,  tha t  the economists engaged in research on international pol i t ical  
economy can gain from the work done by polit ical  s c i en t i s t s ,  especially in 
terms of the i r  experience of the inst i tut ions and polit ical  processes en- 
countered in the international sphere. Up t o  now, there has been relat ively 
1 i t t l e  contact between the Public Choice researchers and other scholars in 
the f i e l d .  This survey has achieved i t s  goal i f  i t  has convinced the reader 
that  the opposite proposition i s  also true: that  pol i t ical  science scholars 
would benefit from considering and studying the Public Choice approach to  
international pol i t ical  economy. 
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